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THE CONSTITUTION
AND THE
DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE:
NATURAL LAW IN
AMERICAN HISTORY
EDWARD J. MELVIN, C.M.*
This year the nation celebrates the bicentennial of the United States
Constitution, the product of four months of debate by the Founding Fa-
thers at the Constitutional Convention of 1787. Actually we have reasons
for continuing this bicentennial from 1987 through 1991. A comprehen-
sive dating of the anniversary could extend after the drafting of the Con-
stitution to 1788, when nine states ratified the document to make the new
government operative, and through 1789, when Congress officially ac-
cepted the Bill of Rights. Thereafter, the anniversary could extend to
1790, when Rhode Island became the last of thirteen states to ratify the
Constitution, through 1791, marking the acceptance of the first ten
amendments by Virginia as the necessary eleventh state to incorporate
the Bill of Rights into the Constitution.
The Constitution, with its first ten amendments, composes one inte-
gral whole. It had no Bill of Rights when first sent to the states for ratifi-
cation. This lack of a list of rights which would incorporate those listed as
"inalienable" in the Declaration of Independence almost defeated the ac-
ceptance of the Constitution. In one key state after another, the omission
was declared an essential defect in the new basic law, and the Constitu-
tion scraped its way to acceptance only on the promise that the omission
would be remedied after ratification.' North Carolina in 1789 and Rhode
* B.A., St. John's University, 1935.
See generally J. MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 627-97 (G. Hunt
& J. Scott ed. 1920) (discussion of various recommendations of ratifying states).
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Island in 1790 agreed to union with the other states under the Constitu-
tion only after the amendments were added to the document and were in
the process of ratification.
From its acceptance in 1788 until the 1880's, the Constitution with
its first ten amendments was considered the national legal implementa-
tion of the legal philosophy proclaimed in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence. The philosophy stated that the nation had that independence to
which it was' entitled by the laws of nature.2 It also stated that certain
rights were inalienable because they were founded in human nature, hav-
ing their source in the Creator of the human race, and that governments
originate to secure these rights among men.3 The disastrous omission
from the Constitution of the legal protection of the rights for which
Americans fought the Revolutionary War was remedied by the first ten
amendments.
Another way to state this philosophy is to say that inalienable, natu-
ral rights are founded in natural law just as civil rights have their founda-
tion in civil law.4 Natural law is that law which natural justice requires,
when proper respect is paid to the human dignity of each individual
human being. It does not give rights to animals or plants. It is the law
which reasonable persons discover when thinking of the basic relations
that ought to govern human beings in their just treatment of each other.
By the law of nature, no man ought to kill me if I offer no harm to him.
Similarly, I ought not to take another's honestly owned property, nor
should he steal mine. All have a right to pursue happiness within the
ambit of the principles of natural law.
The natural law philosophy embodied in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence lay imbedded in thousands of years of human history. Its roots can
be traced back to medieval times and even to centuries before Christ.
Four principal sources for the philosophy have been noted: the heritage
from classical antiquity, such as Aristotle and Cicero; natural law princi-
ples of the medieval scholastic philosophers embedded later in English
common law; Enlightenment rationalist writers of the seventeenth and
See F. LEBUFFE & J. HAYES, THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 223 (4th ed. 1947) (natural
rights lie at the basis of our Republic and our Constitution).
' See generally C. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 24-79 (1922).
' The distinction between natural law and inalienable rights, one common among eight-
eenth century philosophers, has been substantially blurred by Jefferson's use of the term
"inalienable rights" in the Declaration of Independence. While "inalienable rights" include
those rights which may not be transferred to another, for example, the right to life, it has
been suggested that Jefferson intended "natural rights" to be those secured in the Declara-
tion. These rights include those which are antecedent to the state and must be recognized
and respected by the state. See F. LEBUFFE & J. HAYES, supra note 2, at 214. Thus, natural
rights which are independent of civil law, further limit the civil law which is obligated to
respect them. Id. at 221.
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eighteenth centuries, with John Locke held as most authoritative; and the
political and social theories of New England Puritans.5
I. THE NATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS
Soon after the new government was organized, James Madison took
the lead in correcting the "flaw" in the Constitution. Madison was eager
to see the Constitution ratified as a vote of national solidarity, and there-
fore realized that the only way to unite the opposing factions was to rally
for the explicit provisions of the natural law rights already present in the
majority of state constitutions. In his speech to the House of Representa-
tives on June 8, 1789, early in the first session of the First Congress, he
began the drive for the Bill of Rights:
It cannot be a secret to the gentlemen in this house, that, notwithstanding
the ratification of this system of government ... yet still there is a great
number of our constituents who are dissatisfied with it.... We ought not to
disregard their inclination, but, on principles of amity and moderation, con-
form to their wishes, and expressly declare the great rights of mankind se-
cured under this constitution. 6
In the minds of the Founding Fathers, the "great rights of mankind"
included the inalienable rights to life, liberty and the moral pursuit of
happiness. A fourth right was usually listed in state constitutions, the
right to honestly acquired property.7 Other documents list freedom of
conscience as a fifth natural right.8 The amendments were to detail the
specific means whereby the "great rights of mankind," the natural, in-
alienable rights, were to be secured.
In the speech introducing the amendments, Madison showed he knew
exactly what a Bill of Rights should be:
The people of many states have thought it necessary to raise barriers
5 B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 23-35 (1967).
6 J. Madison, Speech before the First Congress of the United States (June 8, 1789), re-
printed in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 198 (C. Hobson & R. Rutland ed. 1979) (em-
phasis added).
7 See VA. CONST. art. I, § 1. The natural right to acquire property flows from the rational
and historical precept that "[taking man as he is... the only way man can fulfil [sic] the
individual and social purposes of his nature is through private property." F. LEBUFFE & J.
HAYES, supra note 2, at 248. Christian moral theology has tempered this virtually unlimited
right by declaring the two-fold aspects of ownership: the individual and the social, the latter
resting upon superior considerations of the social good. Id.
I LeBuffe defines this right as the "immunity from external compulsion in following out-
wardly the dictates of conscience." F. LEBUFFE & J. HAYES, supra note 2, at 240-41. While
this right primarily centers on the freedom to worship according to one's conscience, see VA.
CONST. art. 1, § 16, it has also been legislatively recognized as valid grounds for objecting to
combatant service in the armed forces. See 50 U.S.C. § 456j (1982).
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against power in all forms and departments of government, and I am in-
clined to believe, if once bills of rights are established in all the states as
well as the federal constitution, we shall find that altho' some of them are
rather unimportant, yet, upon the whole, they will have a salutary tendency.
In some instances they assert those rights which are exercised by the
people in forming and establishing a plan of government. In other instances,
they specify those rights which are retained when particular powers are
given up to be exercised by the legislature. In other instances, they specify
positive rights, which may seem to result from the nature of the compact.
Trial by jury cannot be considered as a natural right, but a right resulting
from the social compact which regulates the action of the community, but is
as essential to secure the liberty of the people as any one of the pre-existent
rights of nature. In other instances they lay down dogmatic maxims with
respect to the construction of the government; declaring, that the legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial branches shall be kept separate and distinct:
Perhaps the best way of securing this in practice is to provide such checks,
as will prevent the encroachment of the one upon the other.
But whatever may be [the] form which the several states have adopted
in making declarations in favor of particular rights, the great object in view
is to limit and qualify the powers of government, by excepting out of the
grant of power those cases in which the government ought not to act, or to
act only in a particular mode.9
Thus, the Constitution with its first ten amendments and the laws
and court decisions which depended on it were implementations of the
"laws of nature" of the Declaration. It was to fulfill the very purpose of
government and specify in legal terms how the "great right of mankind"
was to be protected and practiced in the United States. As time went on,
the philosophy of natural law soon gained unquestioned support in Amer-
ican political thought.
II. NATURAL LAW PROCLAIMED IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
Henry Clay and Daniel Webster in the 1840's could make Fourth of
July speeches without mentioning inalienable rights. However, in state
constitutions, the philosophy was expressed and the legal rights which
came from it were specified. The original and later state constitutions
spelled out the principles. Virginia adopted its constitution in 1776 with
its Declaration of Rights:
A declaration of rights made by the representatives of the good people of
Virginia, assembled in full and free convention; which rights do pertain to
them and their posterity, as the basis and foundation of government.
' J. Madison, supra note 6, at 203-04.
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1. That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have cer-
tain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they
cannot by any compact deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoy-
ment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing prop-
erty, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.
15. That no free government, or the blessings of liberty, can be preserved to
any people, but by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperence, fru-
gality and virtue, and by frequent recurrence to fundamental principles.
16. That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner
of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force
or violence; and therefore all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of
religion, according to the dictates of conscience; and that it is the mutual
duty of all to practise Christian forbearance, love, and charity towards each
other. °
The intervening paragraphs further clarified principles of government
and dealt with the specific civil rights which were established to protect
the natural rights.
Kentucky in her constitution of 1792 proclaimed that, "all men, when
they form a social compact, are equal.""1 These phrases appear in most
western state constitutions of the nineteenth century. Even when slavery
became a problem, after the invention of the cotton gin in 1793, the
words were edited rather than the philosophy abandoned. Kentucky, in
1799, changed the phrase to "all free men, when they form a social com-
pact, are equal.' 2 Similar wording appears in the constitutions of Ala-
bama, Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi, and Texas.
III. THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY
A word must be said concerning the institution of slavery in the
United States. It troubled the consciences of the Founders as a situation
which contradicted the philosophy upon which they rooted their own
rights and upon which they were building their legal edifice. Thomas Jef-
ferson wrote a ringing denunciation of the slave trade in his original draft
of the Declaration of Independence, only to have the clause eliminated by
the Continental Congress:
[The king of Great Britain] has waged cruel war against human nature it-
self, violating its most sacred rights of life & liberty in the persons of a
10 The Virginia Bill of Rights (June 12, 1776), reprinted in H. COMMACER. DOCUMENTS OF
AMERICAN HISTORY 103-04 (9th ed. 1975).
11 Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 1. See generally J. COWARD, KENTUCKY IN THE NEW REPuB-
LIC 138 (1979) (noting later limitations on 1792 proclamation).
,1 Ky. CONST. of 1799, art. XII, § 1. See generally COWARD, supra note 11.
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distant people who never offended him, captivating & carrying them into
slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur miserable death in their trans-
portation thither. this (sic) piratical warfare, the opprobrium of infidel pow-
ers, is the warfare of the Christian king of Great Britain. determined (sic)
to keep open a market where MEN should be bought & sold, he has prosti-
tuted his negative for suppressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or to
restrain this execrable commerce ....
It was comforting to blame slavery on the King, but Jefferson in his notes
tells why the clause was struck out:
The clause too, reprobating the enslaving the inhabitants of Africa, was
struck out in complaisance to South Carolina and Georgia, who had never
attempted to restrain the importation of slaves, and who on the contrary
still wished to continue it. Our Northern brethren also I believe felt a little
tender under the censures; for tho' their people have very few slaves them-
selves yet they had been pretty considerable carriers of them to others. 4
The nation would later pay in the blood of the Civil War for the
violation of natural law and natural human rights represented by Ameri-
can slavery. The sincerity and consistency of the Founding Fathers
gained credence by the fact that in their generation there were indica-
tions that the problem might be solving itself. It was being outlawed in
the North and was unprofitable as an economic system in the South.
What changed this was the 1793 invention of the cotton gin. Once cotton
became a profitable crop, another generation attempted to justify slavery
for the black people in their midst. They said the blacks were not able to
take care of themselves and were better treated than factory workers in
the North.
IV. THE NATURAL LAW AND THE CIVIL WAR AMENDMENTS
The injustice of legalized slavery was ended by the Union victory in
the Civil War. Following the war, the legal status of freed blacks was es-
tablished by three amendments to the Constitution. The thirteenth
amendment ended the institution of slavery in 1865;.the fifteenth amend-
ment, in 1879, proclaimed that the right of citizens to vote could not be
denied or abridged by race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Sec-
tion I of the fourteenth amendment is pertinent to the theme of this
essay:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
's C. BECKER, supra note 3, at 166-67.
4 Id. at 171-72.
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shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws. 5
The wording of the fourteenth amendment, ratified in 1868, indicates
a reiteration of the natural law philosophy which the Founders intended
to be the foundation of American law: "nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Professor
Raoul Berger's exhaustive study of the amendment leads conclusively to
this judgment. According to Professor Berger:
The "privileges or immunities" clause was the central provision of the
Amendment's § 1, and the key to its meaning is furnished by the immedi-
ately preceding Civil Rights Act of 1866 [footnote omitted], which, all are
agreed, it was the purpose of the Amendment to embody and protect. The
objectives of the Act were quite limited. The framers intended to confer on
the freedmen the auxiliary rights that would protect their . . . "life, liberty,
and property,". . . and a few historical comments will show the ties between
the two.
At Locke's hands, said Edward S. Corwin, natural law dissolves "into
the rights of 'life, liberty, and estate,' " a derivation noted by Francis Bacon.
The trinity was reiterated by Sir Matthew Hale (footnote omitted) and
sharply etched by Blackstone in his chapter on "the Absolute Rights of
Individuals":
"these may be reduced to three principal or primary articles .... I.
The right of personal security [consisting] in a person's legal and un-
interrupted enjoyment of life, his limbs .... II .... [T]he personal
liberty of individuals . . . [consisting] in the power of locomotion, of
changing situations or moving one's person to whatsoever place one's
own inclination may direct, without imprisonment, or restraint, unless
by due course of law .... III. The third absolute right, inherent in
every Englishman ... of property: which consists in the free use, en-
joyment and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or
diminution, save only by the laws of land."' 6
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
le R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT 20-21 (1977). This writer thinks that Professor Berger's data, given id. at 20-36, leads
to a conclusion opposed to his thesis that the Constitution is merely positive law. He states,
"The Founders were deeply committed to positivism, as is attested by their resort to written
constitutions-positive law. Adams, Jefferson, Wilson, Madison, and Hamilton, states Rob-
ert Cover, 'were seldom, if ever, guilty of confusing law with natural right.' " Id. at 252. A
written constitution is, of course, positive law. It allocates powers and duties of the three
branches of government, it determines terms of office, etc. But the American Constitution
was drafted and amended to implement, by legal protection, the rights which come from
natural law. It is impossible to interpret properly the legal protections due these rights un-
less one understands the natural law origin of these human rights. If the misuse of constitu-
tional freedom of speech causes a riot and deaths, how can one adjudicate properly unless
he understands that in natural law, life is more important than freedom of speech? Berger
states in this quotation: "At Locke's hands, said Edward S. Corwin, natural law dissolves
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V. POST CIVIL WAR RECOGNITION OF NATURAL LAW
Thus, the national Constitution from its beginning, even with its
fateful sickness arising from the compromise over slavery, was the imple-
mentation of the philosophy proclaimed in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence. This purpose of the Constitution to protect the inalienable, natu-
ral rights was proclaimed after the Civil War by the Supreme Court in
1874:
It must be conceded that there are such rights in every free government
beyond the control of the State. A government which recognized no such
rights, which held the lives, the liberty, and the property of its citizens sub-
ject at all times to the absolute disposition and unlimited control of even
the most democratic depository of power, is after all but a despotism....
The theory of our governments, State and National, is opposed to the
deposit of unlimited power anywhere. The executive, the legislative, and the
judicial branches of these governments are all of limited and defined
powers.
There are limitations on such power which grow out of the essential
nature of all free governments. Implied reservations of individual rights,
without which the social compact could not exist, and which are respected
by all governments entitled to the name. No court, for instance, would hesi-
tate to declare void a statute which enacted that A. and B. who were hus-
band and wife to each other should be so no longer, but that A. should
thereafter be the husband of C., and B. the wife of D. Or which should
enact that the homestead now owned by A. should no longer be his, but
should henceforth be the property of B."
An even more explicit appeal to the Declaration of Independence was
given by Justice Field in 1884:
As in our intercourse with our fellow-men certain principles of morality are
assumed to exist, without which society would be impossible, so certain in-
herent rights lie at the foundation of all action, and upon a recognition of
them alone can free institutions be maintained. These inherent rights have
never been more happily expressed than in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, that the new evangel of liberty to the people: "We hold these truths
to be self evident" - that is so plain that their truth is recognized upon
their mere statement - "that all men are endowed" - not by edicts of
Emperors, or decrees of Parliament, or acts of Congress, but "by their Crea-
'into the rights of "life, liberty, and estate .... ' " Id. at 20. But Corwin's use of the word
"dissolves" does not mean annihilate. Corwin uses this expression to indicate Locke's ver-
sion of natural law. Corwin states "As the matrix of American Constitutional Law the docu-
mentary Constitution is still, in important measure, Natural Law under the skin." Cf. UNI-
VERSITY OF NOTRE DAME, NATURAL LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, VOL. III 47, 53 (E. Barrett
ed. 1950). And from Berger's same quotation, R. BERGER, supra, at 20, what are the "abso-
lute" rights from Blackstone if not natural law rights?
17 Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 662-63 (1874).
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tor with certain inalienable rights" - that is, rights which cannot be bar-
tered away, or given away, or taken away except in punishment of crime -
"and that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and to
secure these" - not grant them, but secure them - "governments are insti-
tuted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed.""8
VI. "FIXED" CONSTITUTION VERSUS SUPREME COURT CHANGES
The Constitution can be changed only by the amending process spec-
ified in Article V:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary,
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of
the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention
for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all In-
tents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legis-
latures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three
fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be pro-
posed by the Congress .... 11
As long as it was not amended, the Constitution must be interpreted in
its original sense: the meaning given to it by those who drafted it and the
generation that ratified it.
That the "original intention" of the Framers is binding on later
Court interpretations is evidenced by Madison's words:
[I] entirely concur in the propriety of resorting to the sense in which the
Constitution was accepted and ratified by the nation. In that sense alone, it
is the legitimate Constitution. And if that not be the guide in expounding it,
there can be no security for a consistent and stable, more than faithful exer-
cise of its powers.2 0
This principle of a "fixed" Constitution binds legislatures. James
Madison further stated, "[W]hat a metamorphosis would be produced in
the Code of law if all its ancient phraseology were to be taken in its mod-
ern sense.""1 This same principle must also bind the courts. Chief Justice
Marshall, in the precedent-setting Marbury v. Madison decision, de-
clared: "From these, and many other selections ... it is apparent, that
the framers of the constitution contemplated that instrument as a rule for
the government of courts, as well as of the legislature. Why otherwise
," Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 756-57 (1884) (Field, J.,
concurring).
" U.S. CONST. art. V.
20 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 191 (G. Hunt ed. 1910) (letter to Henry Lee, June 25,
1824).
23 Id.
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does it direct the judges to take an oath to support it?"2 2
VII. SUPREME COURT APPLIES NEW PHILOSOPHY TO CONSTITUTION
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, especially from the
1880's on, Supreme Court interpretations of the Constitution and the
rights which flow from it indicated an abandonment by the Court of the
natural law philosophy which gave it birth. This is all the more regretta-
ble because the one compromise-violation of the natural law in the Con-
stitution, that which protected slavery, was corrected between 1865 and
1870 by the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments.
1887 is noted as the year of change. In 1886, the Supreme Court de-
cided that a corporation was a person within the meaning of the four-
teenth amendment. In 1887, it reversed the long-revered McCulloch v.
Maryland2 3 decision, enunciated in 1819, that the wisdom of a legislative
act is a question for the legislature's judgment. Edward S. Corwin, in his
classic, The Constitution and What it Means Today, states the guideline
which replaced the natural law-natural right principles:
[T]he Court has never exercised its censorship of legislation, whether na-
tional or State, more energetically than during the half century between
1887 and 1937, when its thinking was strongly colored by laissez faire con-
cepts of the role of government. This point of view, translated into conge-
nial constitutional doctrines, like that of "liberty of contract" and the exclu-
sive right of the States to govern industrial relations, brought hundreds of
State laws to grief, as well as an unusual number of Congressional enact-
ments. Two persistent dissenters from this tendency were Justices Holmes
and Brandeis, both of whom thrust forward maxims of judicial self-restraint
in vain.2 '
Historical events shed light on the Supreme Court's stance during
this time. In 1859, Charles Darwin published his "Origin of Species," the
biological theory that all living things were developed from simpler orga-
nisms through a kind of natural selection: the "fittest" would survive and
reproduce, while the weak would die away; the result, he theorized, would
be a constant improvement in surviving species.
Even before Darwin, Herbert Spencer, a contemporary English phi-
losopher, popularized evolution as a universal law leading to progress. He
traced the formation of the earth from an originally nebulous mass, not-
ing that embryological development started with only a mass of cells. All
higher species, he claimed, came from lower ones. With Darwin, he be-
lieved in the survival of the fittest, but Spencer went further; he applied
" Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179 (1803) (emphasis in original).
"8 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
11 E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 176 (1973).
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his evolutionary theories to society. "Any adequate theory of society,"
Spencer concluded, "will recognize the 'general truths' of biology and will
refrain from violating the selection principle by 'the artificial preservation
of those least able to take care of themselves.' "I5 Spencer's application of
evolution to society, though it antedated Darwin, came to be called "So-
cial Darwinism."
According to Spencer, who had a large following in the United States,
progress in society comes in great measure from the economic struggle
among men. In the world of business, the fittest survive; those who can
dominate others by their competitive instinct are the fittest. This was a
wonderful justification for those such as the Carnegies and Rockefellers.
John D. Rockefeller told a Sunday school audience "[t]he growth of a
large business is merely a survival of the fittest.... This is not an evil
tendency in business. It is merely a working out of a law of nature and a
law of God."" James J. Hill, his nineteenth century contemporary, a rail-
road magnate defending business consolidation, similarly said, "the for-
tunes of railroad companies are determined by the law of the survival of
the fittest." 7
Because Social Darwinism was the working of newly discovered natu-
ral sociologic laws, as its devotees argued, the implication was that gov-
ernment should keep its hands off. The laissez faire, let-to-do theory
flowered into political theory and policy. The government had no obliga-
tion to check health conditions in factories, mines, and railroads; indeed,
this would impede progress. If workers had seventy-hour work weeks, if
children under twelve years of age manned sewing machines in the sweat
shops sixty-hours per week, so be it. When individual states passed stat-
utes to protect the lives and health of workers, these laws were interfering
with the new natural law that the "fittest" must survive. Under popular
pressure, however, states did, in fact, pass laws to protect working people.
VIII. SOCIAL DARWINIsM-Laissez Faire COURT DECISIONS
If state legislatures did not believe in Social Darwinism, there was
another way to insure the survival of the fittest millionaires. The courts
could read into law what the popularly elected legislators refused to do,
and that is exactly what happened. In the most celebrated case, Lochner
v. New York,28 the Supreme Court nullified a New York law which had
limited the hours of work in a bakery to not more than sixty hours per
week. The Court used the fourteenth amendment to further the laissez
25 R. HUFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 44 (1965).
26 Id. at 45.
27 Id.
28 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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faire theory of social progress as the proper guide for law. Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, in his famous dissent in the case, castigated the Court's
use of the fourteenth amendment in this manner:
The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social
Statics.... United States and state statutes and decisions cutting down the
liberty to contract by way of combination are familiar to this court ... [a]
constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory,
whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the state or
of laissez faire. . . .I think that the word "liberty," in the Fourteenth
Amendment is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a
dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man neces-
sarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental
principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and
our law .... A reasonable man might think it a proper measure on the score
of health.... ."
One of the fundamental principles of American law is that the police
power of the State is "the power to promote the public health, safety,
morals, and general welfare."30 One can link this principle to the principle
of the Declaration of Independence, that the first purpose of government
is to secure the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness.
It may be said in passing that the fourteenth amendment was never
meant to be used by its framers to assert a new philosophical guideline,
such as laissez faire, to interpret the Constitution. Raoul Berger of
Harvard sums up its purpose-to protect the newly freed blacks after the
Civil War. 1 But by declaring corporations "persons" under the law in
1886, the way was opened to "protect" them with the "privileges and im-
munities" of the fourteenth amendment. The Court applied this new phi-
losophy of Social Darwinism, a philosophy unknown, never contemplated
by the drafters of the Constitution, and not followed by those who wrote
the fourteenth amendment nor agreed to by the people, to interpret the
29 Id. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
30 E. CORWIN, supra note 24, at 388.
3, R. BERGER, supra note 16, at 407. In his exhaustive study he notes another and related
misuse of the fourteenth amendment:
The historical records all but incontrovertibly establish that the framers of the Four-
teenth Amendment excluded both suffrage and segregation from its reach; they con-
fined it to protection of carefully enumerated rights against State discrimination, de-
liberately withholding federal power to supply those rights where they were not
granted by the State to anybody, white or black. This was limited-tragically limited-
response to the needs of black newly released from slavery; it reflected the hagridden
racism that held both North and South in thrall; nonetheless, it was all the sovereign
people were prepared to do in 1868.
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Constitution. This new guideline for interpretation made it unconstitu-
tional for the state and federal governments to interfere with "freedom of
contract" between workers and legal persons-persons which often in-
cluded giant corporations who forced workers to accept contracts which
endangered life and limb.
One commentator summed the Court's approach up as follows:
During the first ten years of the Fourteenth Amendment, hardly a dozen
cases came before the Court under all its clauses put together. During the
next twenty years, when the laissez faire conception of governmental func-
tions was being translated by the Bar into the phraseology of Constitutional
Law, and gradually embodied in the decisions of the Court, more than two
hundred cases arose, most of them under the Due Process of Law clause.
During the ensuing twelve years, this number was more than doubled-a
ratio which still holds substantially.
During this later period, moreover, an increasing rigor was to be dis-
cerned in the Court's standards, especially where legislation on social and
economic questions was concerned."
This insertion by the Court of its own philosophy into constitutional law
and the omission of traditional natural law concepts of the purpose of
government meant that the inalienable rights of citizens were not receiv-
ing the protection due them by government. The Declaration of Indepen-
dence's statement that "to secure these rights governments are instituted
among men" was nullified. While the Court was being guided by laissez
faire concepts, it struck down state and federal laws meant to protect the
people. Meanwhile, giant corporations were preying on natural
law-natural justice rights of defenseless citizens.
The Court, following laissez faire principles, had used a philosophy
to interpret the Constitution which does not flow from the natural law
foundation that produced it. The people never agreed to the insertion of a
new legal philosophy, and the people alone have a right to establish a
constitution or change its meaning. Laissez faire was made an absolute
guide rather than a political attitude of mind. Untold harm was done to
human rights and human dignity by the Court's effort to replace the phi-
losophy of the Declaration of Independence with its own limited con-
cepts. In the sense that the United States is not a Socialist or Communist
state, and therefore the less government the better, laissez faire may very
well be justified. Its limit is reached, however, when natural law-natural
justice is violated.
IX. THE COURT REVOLUTION UNDER ROOSEVELT
The Supreme Court used the laissez faire concept of the proper
32 E. CORWIN, supra note 24, at 388.
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function of government as a guide, and as a philosophy, in its interpreta-
tion of the Constitution from 1887 to 1937. The Great Depression fol-
lowed the New York stock market crash in 1929. There were approxi-
mately twelve million unemployed when Franklin Roosevelt was
inaugurated in 1933. Under his leadership, the National Recovery Act au-
thorizing extensive business regulations, was passed. It was declared un-
constitutional by the Supreme Court in May, 1935. During the months
that followed, the Farm Mortgage Law, the Agricultural Adjustment Act,
the Bituminous Coal Act, and the Municipal Bankruptcy Act were cast
into oblivion by the Court." They were all part of the New Deal which
Roosevelt had promised to the people. In November, 1936, the people
gave Roosevelt a sixty-one to thirty-nine percent endorsement; it was
taken as a rebuke to the Court and represented the peoples' vote against
laissez faire.
To end the impasse, Roosevelt proposed his famous "Court-packing"
plan. He charged that the Court was handicapped by the superannuation
in its members, and proposed that for each Supreme Court Justice on the
bench ten years and six months past his seventieth birthday, another Jus-
tice be appointed. The Court would be expanded to a total of fifteen Jus-
tices; this was within Congress' power, and the President would nominate
the new Justices. The Senate overwhelmingly, seventy to twenty, rejected
the plan, reflecting the view of the people. The constitutional separation
of powers, the system of checks and balances between the judicial, execu-
tive and legislative powers of the American government, were sacred in
American tradition.
A change in Court philosophy arrived when Justice Willis Van De-
vanter resigned in May of 1937 and Justice Hugo Black was appointed to
the Court the same year. Some of the New Deal legislative defeats had
been decided by five to four Court majorities, allowing Social Darwin lais-
sez faire principles to be maintained by the smallest possible majority
Court vote. One or two new Justices could make a difference. However
analyzed, the change in Court attitude concerning laissez faire was evi-
dent from 1937 onward. The Wagner Labor Relations Act and the Social
Security Acts were both declared constitutional in 1937.3" Justice Hugo
Black summed up the Court's new attitude in 1963:
We refuse to sit as a "superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation,"
and we emphatically refuse to go back to the time when courts used the Due
See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (Bituminous Coal Act struck
down); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (Agricultural Adjustment Act); see also H.
MANDELL, MAN MADE MORALs 349-53 (1966).
14 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding National Labor
Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187 (1935)); Steward Machine v. Davis, 301 U.S. 58
(1937) (Social Security Act); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (same).
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Process Clause "to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and indus-
trial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of har-
mony with a particular school of thought" . . . . Whether the legislature
takes for its textbook Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer, Lord Keynes, or some
other is no concern of ours.35
The day when the Court utilized the Social Darwin-laissez faire
guideline for interpreting the Constitution had indeed passed. This did
not mean that the use of the fourteenth amendment to impose the pri-
vate philosophies of the Justices on the nation had departed. The abor-
tion issue is an example of its current usage; thus the problem remains as
a continuing one.
" Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1963) (citations omitted).
